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Abstract
This paper o¤ers a theoretical analysis of imperfect competition in certi-
…cation markets. Firms that intend to engage in a regulated activity must
produce third-party certi…cation of compliance with prescribed regulations and
standards. The certi…cation service is provided by independent certi…ers com-
peting à la Cournot. We show that the interaction between certi…ers and …rms
results in a market equilibrium that can be illuminated by the techniques of
standard oligopoly theory. When certi…ers’ liability is not too low, the cer-
ti…cation fee is determined by the degree of concentration of the certi…cation
market. Due to the peculiarity of this market, a lower concentration is not
always socially desirable.
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1 Introduction
Increasingly, independent bodies are engaged to certify …rms’ compliance with exist-
ing laws, regulations or production standards. Certi…cation intermediaries are found
in a great variety of areas, ranging from security markets, where underwriters and
auditors play a crucial role, to quality and safety assessment, where accredited bodies
guarantee the conformity of products, production units and laboratories to speci…ed
standards.
This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the market for certi…cation services
with imperfect competition à la Cournot. We assume that certi…ers sell their services
to ‘judgement proof’ …rms that intend to start a particular activity (enter a regulated
market) and that need to produce evidence of compliance with standards. As …rms
are reluctant to invest the resources needed to meet the standard, certi…ers serve as
‘gatekeepers of the market,’ with the task of challenging, detecting and stopping the
non-compliant.
In the model, certi…ers are called upon to perform a test of conformity with given
standards, loosely denoted as ‘compliance with the relevant rules’. The actual nature
of the standard is extraneous: we simply assume that one exists and that reduces
the negative externalities produced by operating …rms (this will allow us to conduct
normative analysis).1 Services of this sort are normally provided by auditors and
CPAs with respect to compliance with speci…c laws and regulations (‘compliance
and attestation audits’)2 and by accredited certi…cation bodies with respect to safety
and health standards (‘conformity assessment’).3 Compliance certi…cation by a third
1Quality and safety standards applying to the most variegated industries are regularly produced
by public and private agencies alike. Among the best known are those produced by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO standards) and the CEN-CENELEC-ETSI triad, a set of
European bodies endorsed by the European Commission (EN standards).
2Compliance and attestation audits are wider in scope that …nancial audits, as they can result in
any sort of engagement in which the auditor is asked to provide an assertion “capable of evaluation
against reasonable criteria” and “capable of reasonably consistent estimation or measurement using
such criteria” (AT 3, US Auditing Standards Board).
3Accreditation usually results from the recognition by o¢cial committees like the American
National Standards Institute and the Registrar Accreditation Board (in the US), and the European
Organization for Testing and Certi…cation.
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party is required, for example, from recipients of major federal …nancial assistance
in the US (Single Audit Act and Circular A-128 ), and certi…cation of conformity
(to EN standards) of products and manufacturers is mandatory in many industries
and procurement settings in Europe. Registration in the European Eco-Management
and Audit Scheme (EMAS) requires the ‘validation’ of the …rm’s own environmental
statement by an accredited independent veri…er. Third party veri…cation is also
required from …rms claiming compliance with environmental standard ISO 14001.
We assume that certi…ers are pro…t-maximizing agents that compete in the mar-
ket for certi…cation services. An important postulate is that certi…ers’ e¤ort is not
observable to third parties. This poses a problem of moral hazard, as certi…ers will
exert e¤ort only insofar as they risk liability for erroneous certi…cation.
The main result of this paper is the demonstration that the interaction between
certi…ers and …rms generates a market equilibrium that can be approached with the
techniques of ordinary oligopoly theory. That is, competing certi…ers face a ‘demand
curve’ for certi…cation services that is independent of each certi…er’s level of e¤ort.
The equilibrium certi…cation fee will thus be determined by the total certi…cation
capacity arising from conventional quantity competition, while the fraction of non-
compliant …rms among those demanding a certi…cate will be proportional to certi…ers’
liability.
The involvement of private actors in the enforcement of regulatory standards
raises such important issues as the optimal level of gatekeepers’ liability and the
need for regulation of the certi…cation market. As noted, we address these issues
under the assumption that gatekeepers’ function is to prevent …rms from producing
a negative externality (social harm). We show that the greatest possible liability
is likely to be socially desirable, whereas market regulation turns out to be very
problematic. In fact, despite the formal analogy with conventional markets, the
market for certi…cation services has signi…cant peculiarities. The most important is
that the expected amount of social harm produced by non-compliant …rms depends
on the equilibrium price in the certi…cation market. It turns out that an increase in
competition or the imposition of a price cap may not be socially desirable.
So far, very little theoretical research has been devoted to certi…cation intermedi-
3
aries. Kraakman (1986) gives an interesting description of the possible role of third
parties in the enforcement of rules and regulations and derives a useful distinction be-
tween ‘gatekeeping’ and ‘whistle blowing.’ The former enforcement strategy requires
private parties to prevent misconduct by withholding their cooperation from wrong-
doers; the latter requires them to report information of wrongdoing to enforcement
agencies or potential victims.
Choi (1996) provides a full-‡edged if informal analysis of the role that certi…cation
intermediaries play in information signalling. He points out that certi…ers may di¤er
from generic gatekeepers, as they do not necessarily prevent …rms from selling in
the market. Furthermore, certi…ers may signal their information without a formal
pronouncement, but solely by means of their association with the primary actor (as
in the case of underwriters). As such, certi…cation turns out to be less disruptive
of markets and may exist in market settings where gatekeeping is infeasible. Our
analysis, however, concentrates on the true gatekeeping function, as we assume that
certi…cation is necessary to engage in a regulated activity. Yet, most of our analysis
(but not the normative part) can be extended to the case in which the standard is not
set up to deal with an externality but relates to product quality. In this case, …rms
failing to win certi…cation would still be allowed to initiate the activity but would
necessarily be relegated to the lower tail of the market.
Lizzeri (1997) investigates the optimal disclosure policy for pro…t maximizing cer-
ti…cation intermediaries. The author develops a sophisticated adverse selection model
in which certi…ers may …nd out the …rm’s type with perfect accuracy and without ex-
pense. They sell their services to producers of goods of unobservable quality, where
‘service’ means any kind of (veri…able) information disclosure. The author shows
that, under some conditions, the equilibrium may entail no revelation and monopo-
listic pro…ts for the certi…ers. Albano and Lizzeri (1997) consider the choice of the
optimal disclosure rule by a monopolistic certi…er, assuming moral hazard on the side
of producers. They show that the certi…er will elect to provide noisy disclosures able
to maximize buyers’ surplus.
The role played by gatekeepers in tax enforcement has been investigated by Fran-
zoni (1998). The present essay extends my previous work by focusing on the enforce-
ment of generic regulations instead of income taxes. This means that individuals’
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decisions are not restricted to the amount of taxable income to report, but involve
the choice of whether to start up an activity, and whether or not to comply with
the regulation. Here, in contrast to Franzoni (1998), individuals have di¤ering com-
pliance costs and are distributed over a continuum. Further, the certi…cation fee is
assumed not to be refunded. This highlights a di¤erent aspect of gatekeeping, namely
the possibility that high certi…cation fees themselves constitute an entry barrier.4
Finally, a good deal of research has been carried out in the accounting literature
with respect to …nancial audits, which allow third parties to provide ‘reasonable as-
surance about whether the …nancial statements of an audited entity present fairly the
…nancial position, results of operation, and cash ‡ows in conformity with generally ac-
cepted accounting principles.’ The audit market is known to be dominated by the Big
6, and hence seems to be better captured by imperfect competition models. Starting
with De Angelo (1981), however, the bulk of the auditing literature has concentrated
on price competition, disregarding auditors’ capacity choice.5 Financial audits can be
likened to the veri…cation technology adopted in this paper. An unquali…ed opinion
(a full certi…cation) usually represents a means of obtaining cheap resources on the
capital market. Inaccurate audits do not end up with an externality as is assumed
in this model, but rather with direct damage to the purchaser (the …rm’s …nanciers).
The normative analysis of Section 4 is hence ill …tted for this kind of gatekeeping.
In very brief summary, Section 2 introduces the model and presents a full char-
acterization of the equilibrium of the game; Section 3 illustrates how the parameters
of the model a¤ect the players’ behaviour; Section 4 addresses the main policy issues
attendant upon a certi…cation system; …nally, Section 5 provides a summary and
some …nal remarks.
4Choi (1996) reports that ISO 9000 certi…cation may cost from $15,000 to several hundred thou-
sand dollars for mid-sized US companies. In view of the recent proliferation of certi…cation inter-
mediaries, the fees for the same sort of certi…cation in Italy have plummeted, reaching an average
level of 10 million lire (roughly $ 7,000).
5Auditors’ expropriable wealth has represented one of the key variables for the explanation of
their quality choice. See, for instance, Dye (1993). Doogar and Easley (1998) develop (and test) an
interesting model in which auditors’ cost functions depend on their “size” (endowment of a …xed
production factor).
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2 The model
Let us consider the problem of enforcement of a particular law or regulation placing
special constraints on the …rms that intend to engage in a particular activity. To
get an idea of the situation, one may think of safety and environmental regulations
prescribing that …rms in a certain industry must comply with speci…ed production
standards.
Compliance with the regulation is costly. The actual cost of compliance to the
…rm depends on its type, as it may be more or less close to the prescribed standard.
Compliance costs are assumed to be uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1] :6 The
bene…t to each …rm from engaging in the activity subject to regulation is equal to
b; with b < 1; the bene…t from not engaging into the activity is normalized to 0.
A …rm that starts up the activity without abiding by the regulation is expected to
produce social harm of amount h: For simplicity, we assume that …rms are perfectly
‘judgement proof’ and that they cannot be sanctioned for the harm caused.7 In the
absence of speci…c impediments, all …rms would start the activity, none would comply
with the regulation, and social harm would result.
In an ideal situation with full information, though, only compliant …rms would be
allowed to enter the activity (as h > b), and hence only …rms with a small compliance
cost would do so. This situation can be fruitfully used a as a benchmark for analysis.
Remark 1 In the …rst best outcome, …rms with compliance cost c < b comply with
the standard and engage in the activity. The other …rms do not engage in the activity.
In the presence of asymmetric information, compliance is fostered by requiring
entering …rms to produce a certi…cation. The certi…cation service is provided by in-
dependent intermediaries, which compete à la Cournot. Once engaged, the certi…er
exerts e¤ort to ascertain whether the …rm respects the standard or not. If the certi…er
detects a compliance failure, it does not issue certi…cation and the …rm cannot start
the activity. Conversely, if the certi…er detects no failure, it gives its OK and the ac-
6The uniform distribution yields a linear certi…cation demand function and simpli…es the analysis
of the market equilibrium.
7This means that neither a Pigouvian remedy (a sanction for non-compliance) nor a Coasian
remedy (a liability rule) can be applied.
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tivity is carried out. We assume that certi…ers cannot deny a compliance certi…cation
when the …rm is e¤ectively compliant.
The probability that the certi…er will detect a non-compliant …rm depends on the
level of e¤ort exerted. The e¤ort cost is assumed to be proportional to the ‘quality’
of the certi…cation, i.e. to be equal to sa; where s is the marginal detection cost and a
the probability that a non-compliant …rm will be detected. By exerting a su¢ciently
great e¤ort, the certi…er learns the …rm’s compliance level with certainty. We assume
that random events lead the …rm’s actual compliance behaviour to become common
knowledge with probability ® (e.g. through a government inspection, a change of
ownership, or an accident). In that case, if the certi…cation proves to be erroneous,
the certi…er is liable to a monetary penalty P:
The sequence of move in this game is the following:
1. …rms know their compliance cost and decide whether to engage in the regulated
activity;
2. certi…ers compete on quantities in the certi…cation market;
3. …rms that enter the activity hire a certi…er to get a certi…cation of compliance;
4. upon engagement, certi…ers decide the level of e¤ort to exert;
5. …rms that fail to get a certi…cation cannot initiate the activity;
6. with probability ®; miscerti…cations are detected and sanctioned.
The game is solved through the Bayes-Nash equilibrium concept. We consider
the …rm’s problem …rst, then the certi…er’s optimal choice of e¤ort. The results will
allow us to derive the ‘demand’ for the certi…cation services, which will then be used
to determine the market equilibrium.
Let us start from the problem faced by the single …rm. It has to make two
decisions: i) whether to engage in the activity (and, hence, hire a certi…er), and ii)
whether to comply with the regulation.
Take a …rm that intends to engage in the activity. It will prefer to comply with
the regulation only if
b¡ c > (1¡ a) b;
that is, only if the net bene…t from compliance is greater that the expected bene…t
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from non-compliance [recall that (1¡ a) is the probability of not being detected by
the certi…er]. For simplicity, we assume that random detection occurs after the …rm
has reaped the bene…t from the activity and has produced expected social harm h.8
Given the expected certi…cation quality a; only …rms with compliance costs
c  a b (1)
will comply.
Let us turn to the entry decision. Firms with a compliance cost below ab will
enter the activity only if
b¡ c ¸ p: (2)
Firms with compliance cost above ab will make an attempt to start the activity (and
risk being rejected by the certi…er) only if
(1¡ a) b ¸ p: (3)
Note that the bene…t to compliant …rms from participation is decreasing in c. If
non-compliant …rms make an attempt to enter, then the marginal type, i.e. the one
indi¤erent between complying and not, will enter the activity too, and so will all
…rms with compliance costs less than ab:
The optimal behaviour of …rms can be summarized as follows.
Lemma 1 If (1¡ a) b ¸ p; then all …rms will seek to enter the activity. Only those
with compliance cost c < ab will comply with the regulation.
If (1¡ a) b < p; then the activity will be started only by …rms with compliance cost
c < b¡ p; which will all comply with the regulation.
Let us now turn to the certi…er’s problem. N identical certi…ers are operating
in the certi…cation market. Each decides his own certi…cation capacity and, upon
engagement, the amount of e¤ort to devote to the discovery of the …rm’s compliance
status.
The pro…t for each certi…er i can be written as
¦i = [p¡ s ai ¡ (1¡ ai) vi ®P ]Qi;
8This assumption does not a¤ect the qualitative features of our results.
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which includes the certi…cation fee p; less the detection cost sai; less the expected
liability associated with a miscerti…cation, times the number of tests performed, Qi.
vi is a probability measure that represents the certi…er’s belief that its customers
are non-compliant. Note that if the test reveals that the …rm is non-compliant, the
certi…er has an incentive to deny certi…cation.9
Let us consider the choice of detection e¤ort. Di¤erentiation with respect to the
certi…cation quality ai yields
@¦i
@ai
= [¡s+ vi ®P ] Qi:
Hence, depending on the probability that tested …rms are non-compliant, the certi-
…er’s e¤ort will be such that8><>:
a¤
i
= 0 if vi < s®P ;
a¤i 2 [0; 1] if vi = s®P ;
a¤i = 1 if vi >
s
®P
:
(4)
We assume that the expected liability associated with an erroneous certi…cation is
su¢cient to motivate accurate testing at least when all …rms are non-compliant:
®P > s:
The expected cost of each test is: s ai+(1¡ ai) vi ®P; and, hence, at the optimum:
marginal certi…cation cost =
(
vi ®P if vi  s®P ;
s if vi ¸ s®P :
(5)
In order to calculate the optimal certi…cation quantity provided by each certi…er,
we …rst need to derive the market ‘demand’ for certi…cations. In other terms, we
must derive …rms’ behaviour as a function of the market price p and the expected
certi…cation quality provided by each certi…er.
As a …rst step, one may want to establish whether, in equilibrium, certi…ers may
provide certi…cations of di¤erent quality. The following lemma makes sure that no
di¤erentiation can e¤ectively arise ex post.
Lemma 2 In equilibrium, all certi…ers will exert the same detection e¤ort.
Proof : From eq.(4) ; we know that the certi…er’s e¤ort is greater if the fraction of
non-compliant …rms among those it serves is larger. As non-compliant …rms prefer
9Contingent fees are not admitted.
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not to be detected, they will all demand the service of the certi…er with the lowest
expected quality. This means that non-compliant …rms would all ‘herd’ towards
the certi…er with the smallest fraction of non-compliant …rms unless this fraction is
the same for all. As a result, in equilibrium, the mix between compliant and non-
compliant …rms, as well as the detection e¤ort, will be the same for all certi…ers.10
In equilibrium, we thus have vi = v and ai = a for all certi…ers.
Let us now consider the …rms and certi…ers’ behaviour given the market price p:
If the certi…cation fee exceeds the private bene…t from the activity, p ¸ b; then
clearly nobody enters the activity and QD (p) = 0:
If p < b; we have to consider …rms’ entry and non-compliance decisions together.
We have two possible cases: either all non-compliant …rms enter the market or only
a fraction do.
Consider …rst the case in which all non-compliant types enter the activity. The
fraction among those demanding certi…cation will be v = 1¡ ab (from Lemma 1). If
certi…ers exerted no detection e¤ort, no one would comply with the regulation and
v = 1: Since ®P > s; certi…ers would then exert full e¤ort, a¤ = 1; and non-compliant
…rms would prefer not to enter the activity. In equilibrium, the detection probability
has to be such that the probability of non-compliance given engagement leaves each
certi…er indi¤erent about the level of e¤ort: ai = ¹a for all i; with
(1¡ ¹a b) ®P = s:
Hence,
¹a =
1
b
®P ¡ s
®P
: (6)
In equilibrium, …rms with a compliance cost less than ¹c ´ ¹ab = ®P¡s
®P
will comply,
while the others will not. The demand for certi…cation services is equal to 1.
Note that this equilibrium can occur only if non-compliant …rms …nd it pro…table
10This argument is based on the assumption that the certi…cation price is unique. Yet it also ex-
tends to the case in which certi…ers can quote di¤erent prices (in a model à la Kreps and Scheinkman
1983). In this case, it would be su¢cient to recall that only non-compliant …rms would be willing
to pay a premium for low certi…cation quality. Any certi…er o¤ering low quality would then face
noncompliant …rms only, and would be led to exert full e¤ort.
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to enter the activity, i.e. only if (from eq. 3 ): ¹a  b¡p
b
; that is only if
p  b¡ ¹c:
When the certi…cation fee is high or b < ¹c, the previous inequality is not satis…ed.
Noncompliant types will not …nd it pro…table to apply for certi…cation unless the
certi…cation quality is set below ¹a: They will be indi¤erent between doing it and not
if a = b¡p
b
: In turn, certi…ers will be indi¤erent about detection e¤ort if non-compliant
…rms randomize and enter with a probability x such that
x [1¡ (b¡ p)]
x [1¡ (b¡ p)] + (b¡ p) ®P = s:
In equilibrium, we will hence have
x¤ =
b¡ p
1¡ b+ p
s
®P ¡ s: (7)
In this case, the certi…cation demand will be equal to
QD (p) = b¡ p+ [1¡ (b¡ p)] x¤ = ®P
®P ¡ s (b¡ p ) :
To sum up, the certi…cation demand can be written as:
QD (p) =
8><>:
0 for p ¸ b
®P
®P¡s (b¡ p) for b¡ ¹c  p < b
1 for p  b¡ ¹c (if b¡ ¹c > 0):
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the certi…cation demand on the assumption that b < ¹c and
b > ¹c; respectively.
Figure 1. Unconstrained demand: b < ¹c: Figure 2. Constrained demand: b > ¹c:
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The demand function together with the marginal certi…cation cost determine the
market con…guration. Note that in any continuation equilibrium we have v¤ = s
®P
:
Hence, from eq.(5), the expected marginal certi…cation cost for each certi…er is equal
to s. Further, it can be seen that the certi…er’s pro…t is independent of ai:
¦¤i = [p (Q)¡ s a¤i ¡ (1¡ a¤i ) v¤i ®P ]Qi = [p (Q)¡ v¤i ®P ¡ a¤i (s¡ v¤i ®P )] =
= [p (Q)¡ v¤i ®P ]Qi = [p (Q)¡ s]Qi:
In the market, N symmetric certi…ers compete in quantities. In order to account
for the widest range of possible outcomes, we allow N to be non-integer: N 2 [1;1):
In order to get a complete solution to the market game, one has to make an
assumption about the market price that occurs when QD = 1: The only assumption
compatible with a subgame perfect equilibrium is that the price associated with full
market coverage is the highest: p = b¡ ¹c: Otherwise, certi…ers’ payo¤s would not be
upper-hemicontinuous and there would be no equilibrium.
Through standard Cournot analysis (see the appendix), it can be established that
the equilibrium market quantity is8><>:
Q¤ = N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s if
N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s  1
Q¤ = 1 if N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s > 1
with 8><>:
p¤ = s+ 1
N+1
b if N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s  1
p¤ = b¡ ®P¡s
®P
if N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s > 1
Recall that Q¤ = 1 can occur in equilibrium only when b¡ ¹c ¸ 0; i.e. when certi…ers’
liability is relatively small: P  s
®(1¡b) :
By nesting the equilibrium values into the players’ best reply functions, we obtain
a full characterization of the equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The unique subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized as follows.
If N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s < 1 (partial market coverage), then certi…ers serve Q
¤ =
N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s …rms for a fee p
¤ = s + 1
N+1
b: Firms with compliance cost c¤ 
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N
N+1
(b¡ s) comply with the regulation and enter the activity, while the others do not
comply and try to enter the activity with probability
x¤ =
s
®P ¡ s
1
N+1
N
1
b¡s ¡ 1
:
A fraction
a¤ =
b¡ p¤
b
=
N + 1
N
b¡ s
b
of non-compliant …rms are detected by their certi…er and denied certi…cation. Each
certi…er earns a pro…t equal to
¦¤i =

1
N + 1
(b¡ s)
¸2 ®P
®P ¡ s:
If N
N+1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P¡s > 1 (full market coverage), then certi…ers serve all …rms,
Q¤ = 1; for a fee p¤ = b¡ ®P¡s
®P
: Firms with compliance cost c¤  ®P¡s
®P
comply with
the regulation and enter the activity, while the others do not comply and try to enter
the activity with probability 1. A fraction
a¤ =
1
b
®P ¡ s
®P
of non-compliant …rms are detected by their certi…er and denied certi…cation. Each
certi…er earns a pro…t equal to
¦¤i =
1
N
µ
b¡ ®P ¡ s
®P
¶
:
We have identi…ed two types of equilibrium: in the …rst, the certi…cation fee is
high enough to discourage some …rms from hiring a certi…er and trying to enter the
activity. In the second, all …rms hire a certi…er and try to enter. The second type can
occur only when certi…ers’ liability is relatively small, P  s
®(1¡b) ; and the number of
operating certi…ers is large, N ¸ ®P¡s
®P (b¡s)¡(®P¡s) :
3 Equilibrium properties
In this section, we use Proposition 1 to assess how the equilibrium is a¤ected by
changes in the underlying parameters.
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Number of certi…ers
This variable is relevant only when the equilibrium entails partial coverage.
Suppose that the number of certi…ers in the market increases. As competition
intensi…es, certi…ers perform more tests for a lower price. Certi…ers’ pro…ts decrease.
Thanks to the reduction in the certi…cation fee, more …rms can a¤ord to comply with
the regulation. As this would reduce certi…ers’ incentive to exert e¤ort in detection,
a larger number of non-compliant …rms try to initiate the activity. Further, the
detection rate has to rise so as keep non-compliant …rms indi¤erent between entering
and not. As a result, the detection rate is higher.
As the number of certi…ers grows to in…nity, we have two possible outcomes. If
s > b ¡ ¹c; then the Cournot equilibrium converges to the Bertrand equilibrium. We
have,
lim
N!1
p¤ = s and lim
N!1
Q¤ = (b¡ s) ®P
®P ¡ s < 1 :
At the limit, certi…ers earn zero pro…ts and serve all …rms willing to pay at least the
marginal certi…cation cost s.
If s < b ¡ ¹c; the perfect competition outcome is not approximated. In fact, we
have
lim
N!1
Q¤ = 1 and lim
N!1
p¤ = b¡ ¹c:
With quantity competition, the equilibrium price cannot drop below b ¡ ¹c: At the
limit, the pro…t per test equals b ¡ ¹c ¡ s > 0: Certi…ers serve all …rms and exhaust
their certi…cation capacity.
Certi…ers’ liability
Consider now an increase in certi…ers’ liability for miscerti…cation. Let us start
with the partial coverage equilibrium. As P increases, miscerti…cation becomes more
costly and certi…ers have an incentive to increase the detection probability. Noncom-
pliant …rms o¤set this increased incentive by reducing their entry probability. The
certi…cation demand curve thus rotates to the left. In equilibrium, the certi…cation fee
will be the same, but the quantity of the tests will be lower. The detection probability
will not be a¤ected, as …rms’ incentives to comply are unaltered.
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Let us now consider the full coverage equilibrium, recall that this equilibrium
emerges only when P is relatively small. An increase in certi…ers’ liability increases
their incentive to perform thorough tests. This factor is o¤set by a rise in the compli-
ance level: some …rms that were not compliant turn compliant. However, this means
that both the equilibrium compliance cut-o¤ level and the detection probability are
lower. Somewhat paradoxically, therefore, an increase in certi…ers’ liability reduces
their detection e¤ort.
Detection cost
Let us consider the e¤ect of an increase in the marginal detection cost s on the
partial coverage equilibrium. Due to the decreased incentive for accurate testing, non-
compliant …rms try to enter the market with a higher probability: the certi…cation
demand curve rotates to the right. Since the marginal certi…cation cost is now higher,
the e¤ect on the equilibrium quantity may be of either sign: Q¤ increases if and only
if b > ®P: Whatever the sign of the variation in Q¤; the e¤ect on the certi…cation fee
is positive. Certi…ers’ pro…ts decrease if and only if b > 2®P + s: Since a higher fee
discourages non-compliant …rms from entering, the compliance cut-o¤ is lowered and
the detection probability decreases.
Consider the equilibrium with full market coverage. An increase in s reduces the
certi…ers’ incentive for accurate testing. This leads a fraction of compliant …rms to
turn non-compliant, restoring certi…ers’ incentive. In equilibrium, the compliance
cut-o¤ c¤ and the detection probability a¤ will be lower. Faced with a lower de-
tection probability, …rms will be willing to pay more for certi…cation, and both the
certi…cation fee and certi…ers’ pro…ts will be higher.
Private bene…t
When …rms’ private bene…t from engaging in the regulated activity is greater,
a higher detection rate is required to keep non-compliant …rms out. In the partial
coverage equilibrium, both the detection probability and the certi…cation demand
will be higher. As a result, the certi…cation fee will be higher and the certi…cation
capacity will be lower. Thanks to the rise in the certi…cation fee, certi…ers’ pro…ts
will be higher. More …rms will prefer to comply.
15
In the full coverage equilibrium, non-compliant …rms cannot be kept out. The
increase in the private bene…t does not a¤ect certi…ers’ incentives and has no e¤ect on
the compliance rate. Firms’ additional incentive to comply are o¤set by a reduction in
the detection probability. Finally, since …rms are willing to pay more for certi…cation,
the fee will be higher.
The comparative statics is summarized by Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1. Direction of change: Partial coverage equilibirum
Exhogenous parameters to be increased
Number of Certi…ers’ Detection Private
certi…ers liability cost bene…t
Endogenous variable N P s b
Demand for certi…cation services + - (1) +
Ratio of non-compliant applicants 0 - + 0
Certi…cation fee - 0 + +
Detection rate + 0 - +
Individual certi…er’s pro…ts - - (2) +
(1) Positive if and only if b > ®P:
(2) Positive if and only if b > 2®P + s:
Table 2. Direction of change: Full coverage equilibrium
Exhogenous parameters to be increased
Certi…ers’ Detection Private
liability cost bene…t
Endogenous variable P s b
Ratio of non-compliant applicants - + 0
Certi…cation fee - + +
Detection rate + - -
Individual certi…er’s pro…ts - + +
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4 Policy analysis
This section addresses two policy issues attendant upon the certi…cation market: the
optimal level of certi…ers’ liability and the quest for price regulation.
Social welfare is de…ned as the sum of net private bene…ts to …rms from engaging
in the regulated activity (‘consumer surplus’), less detection costs, less social harm as-
sociated with non-compliance. As usual, no weight is attached to monetary transfers
between parties.
We have
W =
Z c¤
0
(b¡ c) dc+ (1¡ a¤) x¤ (1¡ c¤)| {z }
net ben…t from the activity
¡ [c¤ + x¤ (1¡ c¤)] s a¤| {z }
detection costs
¡ x¤ (1¡ a¤) (1¡ c¤) h| {z };
social harm
where the compliance threshold c¤; the entry probability x¤ and the detection rate a¤
are determined in equilibrium (Proposition 1).
Let us now consider the welfare e¤ect of an increase in P: In the partial coverage
equilibrium, the only relevant variable a¤ected by P is x¤; which decreases. Social
welfare is therefore greater, thanks to the reduction in the number of non-compliant
…rms entering the activity:
@W Part:
@P
= ¡ (1¡ a¤) (1¡ c¤) (h¡ b) @x
¤
@P
> 0;
where ‘Part:’ stands for ‘partial coverage’. If certi…ers’ liability were stretched to
in…nity, we would get
lim
P!1
W Part: =
Z c¤
0
(b¡ c) dG (c)¡ c¤s a¤;
with a¤ = N+1
N
b¡s
b
and c¤ = N
N+1
(b¡ s) : We would still be far from the …rst best
outcome (described in Remark 1): not all the potential gains from compliance would
be reaped (some …rms are put o¤ by the certi…cation fee) and costly detection would
take place.
For low levels of certi…ers’ liability, the equilibrium entails full market coverage,
and the e¤ect of a variation in P is more complicated. In fact, an increase in P yields
higher certi…cation quality and induces a larger fraction of …rms to comply:
dW
dP
Full
= [(b¡ c¤) b+ (h¡ b) (1 + b (1¡ 2a¤))¡ s] @a
¤
@P
;
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with @a
¤
@P
= ¡ s
®P 2
:
Hence,
dW Full
dP
> 0 () s < (b¡ c¤) b+ (h¡ b) (1 + b (1¡ 2a¤)) : (8)
Due to the attendant increase in detection costs, an increase in certi…ers’ liability is
socially desirable only if the marginal detection cost is not too high. Note that eq.(8)
is more likely to hold when a¤ is high, i.e. when P is relatively small.
Let us now consider the e¤ect of a variation in the number of operating …rms.
As the e¤ect of an increase in N is a reduction in the certi…cation fee, comparative
statics can be used to assess the desirability of direct price regulation. Note that
variations in N and p are relevant only when the equilibrium entails partial coverage.
To start with, let us rewrite the equilibrium variables in terms of Q: By sub-
stitution, we obtain c¤ = (1¡ v)Q; x¤ (1¡ c¤) = vQ; p = b ¡ (1¡ v)Q; and
a¤ = (1¡ v) 1
b
Q: Hence,
W Part: =
R (1¡v)Q
0 (b¡ c) dc+ b (1¡ a¤) vQ¡ sa¤Q¡ h (1¡ a¤) vQ; (9)
with
@W Part:
@Q
= (1¡ v¤) (b¡ (1¡ v¤)Q) + bv¤ (1¡ a¤)¡ sa¤ ¡ h (1¡ a¤) v¤
+@a
¤
@Q
[(h¡ b) v¤ ¡ s]Q =
= (1¡ v¤) p¤ + v¤p¤ ¡ sa¤ ¡ h (1¡ a¤) v¤ + 1¡v¤
b
[(h¡ b) v¤ ¡ s]Q:
Hence, through further simpli…cation
@WPart:
@Q
= p¤|{z}
increase in net bene…t
¡ sa¤|{z}
increase in detection costs
¡ (1¡ a¤) v¤h| {z }
increase in social harm
due to more non-compliant applicants
+ a¤ [(h¡ b) v ¡ s]| {z } :
decrease in net social harm
and increase in detection costs
due to increased detection probability
An increase in certi…cation capacity has four e¤ects: 1) it increases the ‘consumer
surplus’, as a greater share of the certi…cation demand is satis…ed; 2) it increases
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detection costs, 3) it increases social harm, as more non-compliant …rms apply; and
4) it increases the detection probability and hence reduces social harm and increases
detection costs.
This formulation highlights the features marking a di¤erence between the certi…-
cation market and conventional markets.
First, variations in certi…cation capacity a¤ect the amount of social harm atten-
dant on non-compliance. This occurs through two means: the increase in the fraction
of non-compliant applicants and the increase in the equilibrium detection probability.
When deciding the amount of certi…cation services to provide, …rms disregard these
e¤ects because they do not a¤ect their pro…ts: the …rst relates to an externality,
while the second is mediated by a variation in a; which does not enter into the …rms’
ex-ante payo¤ function.11 The net e¤ect is equal to ¡h (1¡ a¤) v¤+a¤ [(h¡ b) v¤ ¡ s]
and may be of either sign.12
Second, …rms perceived marginal certi…cation cost, s; is greater than the real
marginal social cost, as; as …rms account their prospective liability payments as costs,
while they are mere transfers.
In view of these two e¤ects, the social optimum does not necessarily correspond
to the point at which price equals marginal costs. This means, speci…cally, that an
increase in competition in the industry, due to the entry of additional certi…ers, is
not necessarily socially desirable.
To specify, the perfect competition outcome with p = s is not desirable if
@W Part:
@Q
¯¯¯¯
¯
p=s
= (1¡ a¤) s¡ h (1¡ a¤) v¤ + a¤ [(h¡ b) v¤ ¡ s] =
=
s
®P
[¡ (1¡ a¤) (h¡ ®P ) + a¤ (h¡ b¡ ®P )]
= s+
µ
1¡ s
b
¶
s
®P
[2h¡ b¡ 2®P ] < 0;
that is, if (upon simpli…cation)
b (h¡ b¡ ®P ) < s (2h¡ b¡ 2®P ) : (10)
11In view of the envelope theorem, the latter result applies whenever the detection cost function
is weakly convex.
12Note that even if h were negligible, the net e¤ect would not vanish. However, it would collapse
to zero if s were negligible. In the latter case, the …rst best outcome would be achieved for N ! 1:
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Note, for instance, that inequality (10) holds (and perfect competition not desirable)
when certi…ers’ liability is in…nite and b > 2s:
Conversely, if @W
Part:
@Q
¯¯¯
p=s
> 0, a certi…cation capacity greater than that arising
from perfect competition is likely to be desirable. In particular, the government
should subsidize a competitive certi…cation industry if @W
Part:
@Q
¯¯¯
p=s
> 0 and @
2WPart:
@Q2

0; where
@2W Part:
@Q2
=
@
@p
"
@WPart:
@Q
#
@p
@Q
= ¡

1¡ s
®P
1
b
(2h¡ b¡ 2®P )
¸ µ
1¡ s
®P
¶
:
Both conditions are satis…ed, for instance, when certi…ers’ liability is in…nite and
b < 2s:
The presence of the two ‘additional’ e¤ects mentioned above makes welfare max-
imization a surprisingly complex problem, whose solution is strictly dependent on
con…guration of the parameters.
5 Final remarks
The model developed in this essay provides a theoretical analysis of imperfect com-
petition in the market for certi…cation services. It is based on the assumption that
…rms are required to produce evidence of compliance with a given standard in order
to engage in a regulated activity. Our main result shows that the certi…cation market
can be analysed with the tools of ordinary oligopoly theory, as certi…ers’ e¤ort of
choice can be separated from their decision on capacity. When certi…ers’ liability is
high, they serve only a fraction of the …rms potentially interested. When liability
and the marginal detection cost are low, certi…ers serve all …rms. In both cases, the
fraction of non-compliant …rms among those demanding a certi…cate is constant, and
depends on the ratio between certi…ers’ expected liability and the marginal detection
cost.
The model is deliberately sketchy about the exact content of the certi…cation:
only the normative analysis of Section 4 is based on the assumption that miscerti…-
cations lead to negative externalities. In fact, the model can be extended to quality
certi…cation, on the assumption that the upper, and most lucrative, tail of the mar-
ket is served by certi…ed …rms only. In such a setup, …rms’ bene…t from certi…cation
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would supposedly relate inversely to the number to …rms that obtain it, due to the
increased competition in the downstream market.13 The demand for certi…cation
services would then be bent downward, as …rms’ willingness to pay for certi…cation
would decrease more than proportionally to the number of applicants. The ratio be-
tween compliant and non-compliant applicants, whoever, wound not change, and the
qualitative properties of our analysis would remain unaltered.
6 Appendix
Derivation of the Cournot equilibrium. Suppose …rst that b < ¹c and consider the
unconstrained demand function:
QD (p) =
(
0 for p ¸ b
®P
®P¡s (b¡ p) for 0  p < b
:
The marginal certi…cation cost is s:
The best reply function of …rm i is obtained by maximizing the pro…t function:
¦i = [p (Q)¡ s]Qi;
with p (Q) = b¡ ®P¡s
®P
Q ´ b¡ kQ:
By setting marginal pro…ts equal to zero, we get
Q¤i =
b¡ s¡ kQ¡i
2k
;
with Q¡i ´ Q ¡ Qi: Since the equilibrium is symmetrical, we have Qi = Q=N and
Q¡i =
(N¡1)
N
Q: Hence
Q¤ =
N
N + 1
b¡ s
k
=
N
N + 1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P ¡ s;
and
p¤ = b¡ kQ¤ = b¡ N
N + 1
(b¡ s) :
13This e¤ect may, however, be countered by an increase in …nal buyers’ willingness to pay due to
the higher average rate of compliance (to prescribed standards) of certi…ed …rms (as the detection
rate increases with Q).
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Suppose now that b > ¹c; and that the demand function takes the form
QD (p) =
8><>:
0 for p ¸ b
®P
®P¡s (b¡ p) for b¡ ¹c  p < b
1 for p  b¡ ¹c :
If s > ¹c; the previous analysis carries through and the market is only partially served.
If s < ¹c; then competition among certi…ers may drive the certi…cation fee so low
that the whole market is served. When deciding their capacity, certi…ers know that
the market demand cannot exceed 1: When the demand is e¤ectively constrained,
certi…ers have no incentive to conduct additional tests. The constraint is binding when
the number of certi…ers is so high as to yield an unconstrained Cournot equilibrium
quantity greater that 1:
N
N + 1
(b¡ s) ®P
®P ¡ s > 1:
Since the unconstrained equilibrium quantity cannot be completely sold, …rms will not
be able to meet their optimal production quantity. In theory, the equilibrium could be
asymmetrical, as …rms could be di¤erently a¤ected by the constraint. For simplicity,
we restrict our attention to the symmetrical equilibrium in which all (identical) …rms
produce the same quantity, Q¤i = 1=N: For a continuity argument, the equilibrium
price has to be equal to b ¡ ¹c : any other price (less than b ¡ ¹c) would cause a
discontinuity in the …rms’ payo¤ functions, thus yielding discontinuous best replies
and non-existence of the equilibrium (as …rms might prefer not to meet the constraint
and produce an aggregate quantity equal to 1¡ "; with " in…nitely small).
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